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THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY:* RULE
10b-5 INSIDER LIABILITY FOR
NONFIDUCIARY BREACH
I. Introduction
The recent increased public awareness of insider trading' is directly
attributable to increased enforcement by courts and the Securities
* As this book was going to press, the Supreme Court decided Carpenter v.
United States, 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987). With Justice Powell's replacement not yet con-
firmed, the eight-member court: (1) held that the defendants' misappropriation of
information from The Wall Street Journal violated the federal wire and mail fraud
statutes; and (2) upheld, by a 4-4 vote, the def endants' convictions for violating sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. Because the Court reached the latter determination by
an equally divided vote, the determination does not establish a national precedent
and leaves the issues raised in this Note for future consideration.
1. As discussed later, infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text, the basic tenet
of the prohibition against insider trading is that certain persons with knowledge
of material nonpublic information about an issuer's securities must either disclose
that information or refrain from trading in those securities. See Langevoort, Insider
Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 CALIF. L.
REv. 1, 1 (1982); Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on Impersonal
Stock Markets: Who is Harmed, and Who Can Sue Under SEC Rule lob-5?, 54
S. CAL. L. REv. 1217, 1219 n.2 (1981); Note, An Outsider Looks at Insider Trading:
Chiarella, Dirks and the Duty to Disclose Material Nonpublic Information, 12
FoR.Hnm URB. L.J. 777, 777 n. 1 (1984) [hereinafter An Outsider Looks at Insider
Trading].
The recent interest in the insider trading area was sparked by the case of Dennis
Levine. On May 12, 1986, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) filed the
largest insider trading enforcement action in history. Levine, formerly associated
with Drexel, Burnham & Lambert, Inc., was charged with reaping $12.5 million
in profits by trading on nonpublic information concerning approximately 54 proposed
mergers and takeovers. See SEC v. Levine, No. 86 Civ. 3726 (S.D.N.Y. filed May
12, 1986). The Levine case achieved great media attention, not only because Levine
was a member of the arbitrage community, see infra note 134, but also because
the three brokerage houses employing him had worked on only a few of the mergers
or takeovers of which he took advantage. See Obermaier, Who's an Insider? What's
Inside?, N.Y.L.J., July 1, 1986, at 1, col. 1 [hereinafter Obermaier].
Paul A. Cohen, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Shearson Lehman
Brothers, Inc., termed the affair "the worst disaster for Wall Street in the past
10 years." Bus. WK., June 9, 1985, at 82. The SEC complaint against Levine
alleged that he had received information "under circumstances in which Levine
knew or had reason to know, or acted in reckless disregard of the fact, that the
information was confidential and had been obtained through misappropriation or
breach of fiduciary duty or other relationship of trust and confidence or other
wrongful acts." Complaint, SEC v. Levine, No. 86 Civ. 3726 (S.D.N.Y. filed May
12, 1986). While it is obvious that the SEC has been thorough in its research, the
allegations in its pleadings go well beyond its own rules. In this regard, the SEC's
reach may very well be exceeding its grasp. Several commentators assert that the
SEC overstepped its bounds in the complaint. See Lewin, Some Assert SEC Pushes
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Exchange Commission (SEC) of prohibitions against that trading.2
The Supreme Court, in Chiarella v. United States,3 left open the
question of whether section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
19344 and Rule lOb-51 should operate against what is commonly
Too Far, N.Y. Times, July 21, 1986, at D-1, col. 3.
The information supplied by Mr. Levine led to SEC allegations of trading on
inside information against arbitrageur Ivan Boesky on November 14, 1986. See
N.Y. Newsday, Feb. 12, 1987, at 5, col. 1; see also SEC v. Boesky, No. 86 Civ.
8767 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 14, 1986). Mr. Boesky settled his case with the SEC
for $100 million in fines and disgorged profits. See N.Y.L.J., Nov. 25, 1986, at
1, col. 2. The Boesky affair has been termed "the greatest scandal to rock Wall
Street in a generation, if not since before the crash of 1929." Id. The allegations
in the Boesky complaint, which also included an allegation of misappropriation,
see infra notes 80-122 and accompanying text, evince the same excessive reach by
the SEC as those in the Levine complaint. See Complaint 11, SEC v. Boesky, No.
86 Civ. 8767 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 14, 1986) [hereinafter Boesky Complaint]. The
Commission alleged, inter alia, that Boesky had been tipped by Levine, who had
in turn been tipped by someone else in breach of a fiduciary duty "or by mis-
appropriation." Boesky Complaint, supra, at 11-13. The former allegation rests on
the theory established in Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), see infra notes 60-
79 and accompanying text, while the latter follows from the unprecedented Second
Circuit holdings of recent years. See infra note 81. In the wake of the Boesky
settlement, the SEC has suggested that its insider trading investigation will soon
turn to entirely new areas. See N.Y.L.J., Nov. 18, 1986, at 1, col. 2.
Other significant recent developments in this area include the SEC disciplinary
proceeding against First Boston Corp., the first disciplinary action against the
corporation in its 52 year history. See Bus. WK., May 19, 1986, at 125. On June
3, 1986, in the largest award ever,: in a contested insider trading case, two co-
defendant were found civilly liable for $3.5 and $1.3 million by Judge Pollack,
of New York's Southern District, for "callously" taking advantage of Edgar
Bronfman, Seagram's Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, in obtaining inside
information. See Judge Finds 2 Men Guilty Of Inside Trades, Wall St. J., June
4, 1986, at 2, col. 2.
2. Scholarly criticism has challenged the viability of the insider trading laws.
See, e.g., H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING IN THE STOCK MARKET (1966) [hereinafter
INsIDER TRADING IN THE STOCK MARKET]; Phillips, The Insider Trading Doctrine:
A Need For Legislative Repair, 13 HOFSTRA L. REv. 65 (1984); Note, Financial
Reporters, the Securities Laws and the First Amendment: Where to Draw the Line,
53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1035 (1985) [hereinafter Financial Reporters]. Some articles
favor the broad interpretation by the courts of the insider trading antifraud
provisions. See Note, The SEC's Regulation of the Financial Press: The Legal
Implications of the Misappropriation Theory, 52 BROOKLYN L. REV. 43 (1986); see
also Aldave, Misappropriation: A General Theory of Liability for Trading on
Nonpublic Information, 13 HOFSTA L. REV. 101 (1984) [hereinafter Misappro-
priation: A General Theory of Liability]. Other articles have criticized the courts'
extension of Rule lOb-5, through the misappropriation theory, to trading by financial
reporters based on their own analyses. See, e.g., Note, The Inadequacy of Rule
lOb-5 to Address Outsider Trading by Reporters, 38 STAN. L. REv. 1549 (1986).
3. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
4. See infra note 25.
5. See id.
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called "misappropriation." ' 6 The misappropriation theory basically
incorporates common law fiduciary concepts within the ambit of
federal securities statutes regulating the purchase and sale of se-
curities.7 In a significant and controversial decision, the Second
Circuit recently affirmed the conviction of R. Foster Winans, a
former Wall Street Journal reporter, for securities fraud and mail
and wire fraud.' By extending Rule lOb-5 insider trading liability
to include the misappropriation theory, 9 this decision has greatly
expanded the scope of that liability.
Responsibility for this unprecedented expansion lies with the SEC
for failing to promulgate a rule defining insider trading. This Note,
however, does not reach the question whether insider trading pro-
hibitions should be repaired.10 Rather, its purpose is to demonstrate
6. See infra notes 80-122 and accompanying text. Justice Stevens, in his con-
currence, suggested that "respectable arguments could be made in support of either
position .... I think the Court wisely leaves the resolution of this issue for another
day." Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 238 (Stevens, J., concurring).
7. For a more detailed discussion of the misappropriation theory, see infra
notes 80-122 and accompanying text.
8. The nonjury conviction of Winans and two co-defendants was affirmed by
a vote of two-to-one. United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.), cert.
granted, 107 S. Ct. 666 (1986). Carpenter is more commonly known as the Winans
case, but for the purposes of this Note it will be referred to as Carpenter. See
Taylor, Winans Case Taken By Justices: Insider Rules Among Issues, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 16, 1986, at DI, col. 3.
9. See infra notes 80-122 and accompanying text.
10. Many articles have criticized the insider trading laws. See supra note 2.
These articles have also proposed new rules and standards for the SEC to adopt
in determining insider trading liability. In June, 1986, Congress began hearings on
insider trading. Former SEC Chairman John S. R. Shad testified that "no new
legislation was necessary to combat problems with insider trading." N.Y. Times,
June 19, 1986, at D6, col. 5. He informed Congress that as of the date of his
testimony, the SEC had recovered $25 million in illicit insider trading profits from
18 insider trading cases-compared to the 20 cases in all of 1985 of which $11
million was recovered from the Levine settlement alone. See id. Shad cautioned
Congress, however, that while "[t]here is too much insider trading ... it should
not be exaggerated out of proportion." Id. This statement followed an earlier
proposal by Mr. Shad that the SEC offer rewards for information on those who
spread rumors and trade on inside information. Id.
Furthermore, the SEC opposed the inclusion of a definition of insider trading
when Congress considered and passed the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984.
15 U.S.C. § 78(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 11 1984). The SEC has also opposed any amendment
to the Exchange Act to include such a definition. One such definition the SEC
could have easily adopted appears in the proposed Federal Securities Code. FED.
SEC. CODE § 1603(b) (1980). The absence of such a definition explains the
courts' deviation from, and expansion of, the insider trading laws, specifically Rule
lOb-5, to include the misappropriation theory. See Obermaier, supra note 1, at 2,
col. 4.
On August 7, 1987, the SEC proposed a bill to define insider trading. If
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the inappropriateness and detriment of extending those already flawed
prohibitions by adopting a misappropriation theory.
In Part II, this Note surveys the history of section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5" and monitors their application in early judicial decisions. 2
After discussing the period of judicial and administrative expansion
of liability under these antifraud provisions, 3 the Note turns to those
decisions restricting the provisions' bounds. 4 This Note then discusses
United States v. Carpenter, in which the Second Circuit expanded
insider trading liability to the greatest degree yet. 5 The Note will
then show how the misappropriation theory does not fit within the
statutory purposes of these provisions. 6 Congress and the SEC did
not intend to include misappropriation when they enacted and pro-
mulgated these provisions. Extending the provisions to reach the
growing problem of insider trading goes against basic premises of
statutory construction consistently articulated throughout the history
of the Court. 7
II. The History of the Misappropriation Theory
Section A of this part will explain the purposes and policies behind
the enactment and promulgation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
Section B will follow with discussion of some early decisions applying
these provisions and of the later expansion of these provisions by
the SEC and the courts. Section C will illustrate the Supreme Court's
return to the traditional principles of insider trading liability estab-
lished by the early decisions.
A. The Exchange Act: Its Purpose and Intentions
In the midst of the Great Depression, Congress created the SEC
in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)." The Ex-
change Act, which primarily regulates trading of securities on the
passed, it is said the bill will strengthen prosecution in "less clear-cut cases" of
insider trading. S.E.C. Goal: Sharp Aim in Vague Insider Cases, N.Y. Times,
August 7, 1987, at D1, col. 1.
11. See infra note 25.
12. See infra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 44-79 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 80-122 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 123-46 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 149-60 and accompanying text.
18. Securities Exchange Act, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881, 885 (1934) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1982)).
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stock exchanges and the over-the-counter market, 9 delegated broad
regulatory powers to the SEC to protect investors from fraud in
securities transactions. 20
The Exchange Act, including section 10(b), was one of a series
of statutes designed:
[T]o eliminate certain abuses in the securities industry, abuses
which were found to have contributed to the stock market crash
of 1929 and the depression of the 1930's .... A fundamental
purpose, common to these statutes, was to substitute a philosophy
of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus
to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities
industry.2'
Thus, as is evidenced by the Senate Report accompanying the Se-
curities Act of 1933,22 the securities laws were enacted to protect
the investing public, to provide the public with full disclosure of
19. See infra note 20. Note, however, that the Exchange Act is not the only
means of such regulation. In United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (1979), the
Court ruled that although the Exchange Act and the Securities Act of 1933 overlap
in some cases involving similar conduct, the 1933 Act still applied. Id. at 777-78.
Although the 1933 Act was primarily concerned with regulating new offerings,
section 17(a) of the 1933 Act "was intended to cover any fraudulent scheme in
an offer or sale of securities, whether in the course of an initial distribution or
in the course of ordinary market trading." Id. at 778.
20. See OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT MANUAL 613
(rev. ed. 1985).
21. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (footnotes
omitted). The Court went on to say: " 'It requires but little appreciation . . . of
what happened in this country during the 1920's and 1930's to realize how essential
it is that the highest ethical standards prevail' in every facet of the securities
industry." Id. at 186-87 (quoting Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341,
366 (1963)).
22. S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933). The Senate Report clearly
evidences Congress' intent in enacting the securities laws:
The purpose of this bill is to protect the investing public and honest
business .... The aim is to prevent further exploitation of the public
by the sale of unsound, fraudulent, and worthless securities through
misrepresentation; to place adequate and true information before the
investor; to protect honest enterprise, seeking capital by honest pre-
sentation, against the competition afforded by dishonest securities offered
to the public through crooked promotion; to restore the confidence of
the prospective investor in his ability to select sound securities; to bring
into productive channels of industry and development capital which has
grown timid to the point of hoarding; and to aid in providing employment
and restoring buying and consumer power.
Id.; see also Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 155 (1976) (primary
purpose of Exchange Act is to provide "fair and honest" mechanism for trading
by investors).
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material securities-related information, to protect the public from
fraud and to promote honest and fair dealing in the marketplace,23
and to preserve the integrity of the market. 24
Rule lOb-5, which the SEC promulgated in 1942 pursuant to section
10(b) of the Exchange Act, 25 has long been the primary tool by
23. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976). In Ernst, the
Court stated:
The 1934 Act was intended principally to protect investors against ma-
nipulation of stock prices through regulation of transactions upon se-
curities exchanges and in over-the-counter markets, and to impose regular
reporting requirements on companies whose stock is listed on national
securities exchanges.
Id.; see also Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 26-29 (1977) (enactment
of Williams Act continued Exchange Act's basic theme of investor protection);
SEC v. Southwest Coal & Energy Co., 624 F.2d 1312, 1318 (5th Cir. 1980) (primary
goal of federal securities laws is to give investor benefit of full disclosure to allow
intelligent investment decisions); Lank v. New York Stock Exch., 548 F.2d 61, 65
(2d Cir. 1977) (intended beneficiary of Exchange Act is public investor).
24. See supra note 22.
25. The SEC promulgated Rule lob-5 in 1942 under the authority of section
10(b). The rule reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails,
or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,
or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987).
Section 10(b) is one of the major antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act. 15
U.S.C. § 78a-78kk (1982). Section 10(b) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or
of any facility of any national securities exchange . . .
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not
so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). The other anti-fraud provision, section 15(c)(1), prohibits
any broker or dealer from inducing the purchase or sale of securities through
"manipulative" or "deceptive" devices. Id. § 78o(c)(1) (1982).
Rule lob-5 must not be a tool for protecting the relationship between an employer
and employee. See infra notes 80-160 and accompanying text. Congress did not
intend that the common law rule protecting that relationship be encompassed within
1054 [Vol. XV
1987] MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY 1055
which the Commission has combatted insider trading.26 Traditionally,
an individual is liable under Rule lOb-5 when he has obtained material
the scope of Rule l0b-5. Indeed, the "scope [of Rule lob-5] cannot exceed the
power granted the Commission by Congress under § 10(b)," Ernst, 425 U.S. at
214, which only prohibits the use of a "manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance." 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). The general fraud provisions of Rule
lOb-5, however, make it unlawful "to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud" or engage in an "act, practice, or course of business which operates . ..
as a fraud or deceit." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987). The plain meaning of the
rule and statute purports to prevent failures to disclose only when the non-disclosure
amounts to a "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance," but does not
encompass frauds made by an employee against his employer that are not related
to disclosure. See Ernst, 425 U.S. at 214. Congressional concern in enacting section
10(b) focused on preventing the use of manipulative and deceptive devices in
connection with the purchase or sale of a stock-a practice with the danger of
artificially and wrongfully affecting the market price of the security. See supra
note 2 and accompanying text. It should be noted that the language contained in
section 10(b) was originally in section 9(c) of the Senate and House bills. See S.
REP. No. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); H.R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934);
see also H.R. REP. No. 8720, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). The committee hearings
regarding the language of section 9(c) reveal that it was intended to cover all types
of manipulation and deception not covered in other subsections of section 9. See
Hearings on Stock Exchange Regulations Before the House Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934). Other subsections of sec-
tion 9 cover various specific practices which have the potential to result in a false
appearance of active trading thereby artificially effecting the market. For example,
"short" sales and "stop-loss" orders. Trading on nonpublic material information,
it has been argued, does not artificially affect market price. Rather, it tends to push
the market price of a security in the right direction. See generally INSIDER TRADING
IN THE STOCK MARKET, supra note 2 (prohibition against insider trading ignores goals
of allocative market efficiency); Note, Leveraged Buyout, Management Buyout, and
Going Private Corporate Control Transactions: Insider Trading or Efficient Market
Economics?, 14 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 685, 705-706 [hereinafter Leveraged Buyout];
An Outsider Looks at Insider Trading, supra note 1, at 790. Therefore, Congress'
intention may not be served by including acts of trading on material nonpublic in-
formation within the ambit of the words "manipulative or deceptive device or con-
trivance." See id. In fact, many commentators have asserted that insider trading,
in general, has no harmful effect on the securities markets. See id.; see also Carlton &
Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REv. 857 (1983); Dooley, En-
forcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1 (1980); Fischel, Insider
Trading and Investment Analysts: An Economic Analysis of Dirks v. Securities
Exchange Commission, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 127 (1984); Macey, From Fairness to
Contract: The New Direction of the Rules Against Insider Trading, 13 HOFSTRA
L. REv. 9 (1984); Wu, An Economist Looks at Section 16 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 260 (1968). In a television interview, an authority
on trading in the securities markets asserted that the SEC crackdown on insider
trading was a serious mistake. Interview by David Brinkley of Alan Greenspan,
former Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisors and present
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board (Mar. 15, 1986).
26. As Justice Rehnquist noted in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723 (1975), when dealing with Rule lob-5 "we deal with a judicial oak
which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn." Id. at 737. Justice
Rehnquist noted that although Congress had intended for the rule to expand, the
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nonpublic information27 as a result of his position in a company
and then trades on the basis of that information. 2 The securities
acts were neither intended to regulate common law fiduciary duties
between employers and employees, 29 nor to implement internal cor-
porate policy.30 Section 10(b) was intended to benefit the investing
public and to preserve the integrity of the securities markets, not
to deal with matters such as employer/employee duties or corporate
policy., ,
B. Origin and Expansion of the Misappropriation Theory
Insider trading has long been recognized as a breach of a fiduciary
obligation to the shareholders of a corporation.12 Thus, in the seminal
Court ultimately held that it was not the intent of Congress to interpret the statute
as it was. Id. The language of Rule 10b-5 and its history show that the structure
of the "acorn" was not intended to include a branch such as the misappropriation
theory, which would impose liability upon persons who misappropriate material
nonpublic information but who do not owe any fiduciary duty to those persons
upon whose information they traded. See infra notes 124-33 and accompanying
text.
27. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
28. For example, assume a person is in a position to learn of confidential
corporate matters. He may obtain information about the company which is not
known publicly, and then he may buy or sell stock in the company based on this
information. The substance of this nonpublic information might involve an im-
pending merger or acquisition of his company. The price of the stock of a target
company typically rises when the news of an impending merger or acquisition
becomes public. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1005 (1971). The corporate insider may, after receiving
the nonpublic information, purchase stock of the target corporation, and when the
merger or acquisition is announced, sell the stock for a profit.
29. Traditionally, this common law principle has been a matter of state law.
See, e.g., CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 769 F.2d 842 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 1198 (1986); S1 Handling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244 (3d
Cir. 1985); Zoecon Indus. v. American Stockman Tag Co., 713 F.2d 1174 (5th
Cir. 1983); Rohm & Haas Co. v. Adco Chem. Co., 689 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1982);
Hollingsworth Solderless Terminal Co. v. Turley, 622 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1980);
Southland Reship, Inc. v. Flegel, 534 F.2d 639 (5th Cir. 1976).
30. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
31. See id.; see also Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 555 (1982). Chief
Justice Burger noted in Weaver that in enacting the securities laws Congress "did
not intend to provide a broad federal remedy for all fraud." Id. at 556. This Note
will later illustrate how the misappropriation theory, as developed by Chief Justice
Burger, contradicts the very principle he established in Weaver. See infra notes 80-
160 and accompanying text.
32. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 803 (E.D. Pa. 1947)
(Exchange Act became effective through application of well-established fiduciary
principles); see also Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del.
1951) (corporate insider violated fiduciary duty to disclose).
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case of In Re Cady, Roberts & Co.," the SEC declared that a
corporate insider has a duty to abstain from trading in the shares
of his corporation unless he has first disclosed all material infor-
mation known to him.3 4 The Commission made it clear, however,
that this duty to disclose exists only when the company maintains
a "special relationship" with the individual trading its securities.35
In the landmark insider trading case, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co.,3 6 this rule became known as the "disclose-or-abstain" rule.
Subsequent to the Cady, Roberts and Texas Gulf Sulphur decisions,
insider trading prohibitions underwent steady expansion.17 As part
of this expansion, courts and the Commission extended Rule lob-5
liability to outsiders as well as insiders.3"
33. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
34. The SEC stated that the fiduciary duty to disclose, or abstain from trading
upon, material information under Rule lOb-5 "has been traditionally imposed on
corporate 'insiders,' particularly officers, directors, or controlling shareholders. We,
and the courts have consistently held that insiders must disclose material facts which
are known to them by virtue of their position but which are not known to persons
with whom they deal and which, if known, would affect their investment judgment."
Id. at 911.
35. Id. at 912. In doing so, the SEC pointed out that its "task here is to
identify those persons who are in a special relationship with a company and privy
to its internal affairs, and thereby suffer correlative duties in trading its securities.
Intimacy demands restraint lest the uninformed be exploited." Id.
36. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971); see infra
note 58.
37. See infra note 38.
38. The traditional distinction between insiders and outsiders focused solely upon
the definitions given by the SEC. Under section 16(a) of the Exchange Act, an
insider is a director, officer or shareholder owning more than 10%0 of the equity
securities of a corporation. See Exchange Act § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1982).
This definition of insider was subsequently expanded by the courts. The first
such expansion came in Cady, Roberts, an SEC administrative proceding in which
the court found a broker-dealer liable under Rule lOb-5. See supra note 34. The
broker allegedly had used confidential information regarding a corporate decision
to cut a dividend in recommending that a customer sell a security. See Cady, Roberts,
40 S.E.C. at 909. The court applied the facts to two elements: first, the existence of a
relationship giving access to inside *information intended for a corporate purpose
and second, the unfairness involved where a corporate insider takes advantage of
the information by trading it without disclosure. Id. at 912. Thus, the Commission
regarded the insider "relationship" in terms of access to nonpublic information rather
than in terms of a common law fiduciary duty. Id.; accord Chiarella, 445 U.S. at
249. This interpretation comports with the principle that the antifraud provisions
of the federal securities laws are not to be "circumscribed by fine distinctions and
rigid classifications" as they were at common law. Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912.
A decade later, the SEC significantly expanded the Cady, Roberts rule in In
re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971). Apparently, differences of
opinion at the SEC concerning the theoretical bases of insider trading liability
19871 1057
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C. An End to the Expansion Era: Chiarella
Since the Texas Gulf Sulphur decision, 39 the SEC has argued that
the antifraud provisions of the securities laws40 mandate a parity of
access to information among all traders in the securities markets. 41
Accordingly, the SEC has maintained that when a person comes
into possession of material nonpublic information, regardless of
whether he is an insider or a tippee, 42 the person must disclose or
refrain from trading upon that information until it has been generally
disseminated to the public. 43 The Supreme Court rejected this prin-
ciple in Chiarella v. United States.44 The Court relied on the well-
established principles formulated in Cady, Roberts.45 Chiarella, an
employee of a financial printer, handled various documents including
corporate announcements of takeover bids. 46 Although the names of
the target corporations were purposely left blank or given dummy
names, Chiarella was able to deduce the actual names of the target
corporations.47 He then purchased stock in these target corporations
mandated the SEC to redefine the insider trading boundaries. See id. at 651. The
SEC opinion in Investors Management set forth the doctrine that one who obtains
material nonpublic corporate information which he has reason to kfiow emanates
from a corporate source, and which, by itself places him in a position superior
to that of other investors, acquires a relationship with respect to that information
within the purview and restraints of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws.
See id. at 643. Only the concurring opinion of SEC Commissioner Smith was
adopted by the Second Circuit in Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974), and subsequently by the Supreme Court in Dirks
v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). In his concurring opinion, Commissioner Smith
posited that tippee liability, see infra note 71, must relate back to insider respon-
sibility by a finding that the tippee knows the information was given to him through
a breach of duty by a person with a "special relationship" to the issuer of the
information not to disclose it. Investors Management, 44 S.E.C. at 651. Further;
in addition to the requirement that the information be nonpublic and material, it
must have contributed substantially to the trading that ensued. See Dirks, 463 U.S.
at 655 n.14; Investors Management, 44 S.E.C. at 645.
39. See supra note 36.
40. See supra note 25.
41. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 657.
42. See id. at 648-49.
43. See id. at 656-58. The Supreme Court does not impose a duty to disclose upon
one who receives nonpublic information from an insider merely because the insider
has such a duty. Id. at 657-58. Because no relationship existed and the Dirks
Court rejected the SEC's theory, Dirks avoided liability under Rule lob-5. Id. at
665. For a more detailed discussion of the Dirks case, see infra notes 60-79 and
accompanying text.
44. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
45. See supra notes 34-35.




using this information and, immediately after the takeover was
consummated, sold the stock at a profit. 48 As the employee of a
financial printer, Chiarella owed no duty to the corporations whose
securities he traded. 49 Thus, by reversing Chiarella's conviction, 0 the
Court rejected the principle that the securities laws were intended
to ensure equality of information in the marketplace or that buyers
and sellers of securities owe a general duty to the trading markets.5
Aside from promoting disclosure and fair dealing, the securities
laws do not purport to protect less informed buyers and sellers of
securities from those who are better informed. 52 As the Supreme
Court has stated: "[N]ot every instance of financial unfairness con-
stitutes fraudulent activity under [section] 10(b)." 53 One does not
assume a duty to disclose material information simply from an ability
to obtain information that stems from one's status in the marketplace.
4
Rather, potential insider trading liability arises only when a party
has legal obligations beyond a duty to comply with the antifraud
provisions of the securities laws.55 A duty to disclose or refrain from
trading arises out of the "relationship" between the parties.56 This
relationship need not be that between a purchaser and. seller of
securities. 7 It has been suggested that misappropriation of material
48. See id.
49. See id. at 235.
50. See id. at 237.
51. See id. at 231-32 n.14. In this footnote, the Court rejected the " 'regular
access to market information' " test adopted by the Second Circuit. Id. at 231
n.14. The Second Circuit had relied on this test to create a rigid rule embracing
" 'those who occupy ... strategic places in the market mechanism.' " Id. (quoting
United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S.
222 (1980)). The Supreme Court, however, did not hold these considerations suf-
ficient to support a duty to disclose. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231-32 n.14.
52. See id. at 232.
53. Id.; see Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474-77 (1977).
54. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231-32 n.14.
55. See id. at 232-33.
56. See id. at 232.
57. See id. at 236. The Court left open this question because it was not submitted
to the jury. See id. at 236. The lower court instructed the jury to find only whether
a duty existed between Chiarella and the sellers. See id. The Supreme Court,
therefore, refused to speculate as to whether a breach of such duty constituted a
section 10(b) violation. See id. Justice Stevens stated in his concurring opinion that
persuasive arguments could be made that Chiarella's conduct would constitute a
fraud or deceit upon his employer and his employer's clients only if he had a
"duty to the acquiring companies that had entrusted confidential information to
his employers," but that it could also be argued that there was no actionable
violation of Rule lob-5 because the clients were neither purchasers nor sellers of
the target company's securities. Id. at 238 (Stevens, J., concurring). Stevens added
that "the Court wisely leaves the resolution of this issue for another day." Id.
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nonpublic information in breach of fiduciary relationships (such as
an employee-employer relationship or attorney-client relationship)
might be sufficient to create a duty to the buyer or seller of
securities.58 Nevertheless, one possessing such information, absent
The Carpenter court extended this theory, which has been adopted by the Second
Circuit and labeled the "misappropriation theory," to include breaches of securities-
related duties to the employer who was entrusted with confidential information,
not to the injured companies. See infra notes 80-145 and accompanying text.
58. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235-36; Misappropriation: A General Theory of
Liability, supra note 2, at 122. Case law, subsequent to Cady, Roberts and prior
to Chiarella, comports with this well-founded principle. Cases such as SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969),
illustrate the need for a special relationship before a trader has a duty to disclose
so as not to violate Rule lOb-5. In Texas Gulf Sulphur, the SEC sought to compel
the rescission of securities transactions entered into by several officers of the defendant
corporation because of a duty to disclose inside corporate information before trading
upon it. See id. at 839-42. In finding such a duty, the court referred to traditional
common law fiduciary concepts. Id. at 848. In other words, silence constitutes
fraud where there is a duty to disclose because of a fiduciary or other special
relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction. See, e.g.,
Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 431 (1909); Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d
494, 502, 248 N.E.2d 910, 914, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 84 (1969); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976).
Since the Texas Gulf Sulphur case, other courts have firmly established that
nondisclosure amounts to a Rule lob-5 "manipulative or deceptive device or con-
trivance" only when such nondisclosure constitutes a breach of a duty to disclose
arising out of the special relationship between the trader of the stock, or the
original source of the information, and the issuer of that particular stock. See
Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524 F.2d 275, 279 (2d Cir.
1975) (absent relationship and duty to disclose, nondisclosure of material nonpublic
information is not Rule lOb-5 violation); Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz,
464 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1972) (purpose of Rule lob-5 is to prevent corporate
insiders and their tippees from taking unfair advantage of uninformed outsiders).
This well-established principle was clearly delineated in the 1978 Proposed Official
Draft of the Federal Securities Code by the American Law Institute. See supra
note 10. Under the proposed code, nondisclosure may be unlawful in connection
with a securities transaction when a person fails to disclose in accordance with
such a duty. See FED. SEC. CODE § 262 (1978). The ALI proposed code provides,
in pertinent part:
Sec. 1603(a) [General] It is unlawful for an insider to sell or buy a
security of the issuer, if he knows a [material fact] with respect to the
issuer or the security that is not generally available ....
(b) . . . "insider" means (1) the issuer, (2) a director or officer of,
or a person controlling, controlled by, or under common control with,
the issuer, (3) a person who, by virtue of his relationship or former
relationship to the issuer, knows a fact of special significance about the
issuer or the security in question that is not generally available, or (4)
a person who learns such a fact from a person specified in section 1603(b)
... with knowledge that the person from whom he learns the fact is
such a person ....
Sec. 1602 .... (a) [General] It is unlawful for any person to engage




such a relationship, owes no duty to refrain from profiting from
his tip. 9
D. Dirks: Chiarella Reiterated and Reaffirmed
In Dirks v. SEC,: Raymond Dirks, an officer of a New York
brokerage firm, received information from a former officer of Equity
Funding of America (Equity Funding).6 1 The former officer alleged
that Equity Funding had engaged in fraudulent business practices.6 2
Dirks personally investigated Equity Funding to test these allegations,
and in so doing publicized the information he had obtained to
various institutions, which then sold their holdings in Equity Funding.63
Sec. 262. . . . (b) Inaction or silence when there is a duty to act or
speak may be a fraudulent act.
Id. (emphasis added). The proposed code clearly shows that unless some relationship
exists with the corporation whose securities were traded, the person who acquired
the information and his tippee are free to use the information to their benefit
without potential liability under Rule lOb-5. See infra note 59 and accompanying
text.
Judge Friendly recognized the need for the existence of such a relationship as
a predicate to Rule lob-5 liability in General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc.,
403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969).
We know of no rule of law, applicable at the time, that a purchaser
of a stock, who was not an "insider" and had no fiduciary relation to
a prospective seller, had any obligation to reveal circumstances that might
raise a seller's demands and thus abort the sale.
403 F.2d at 164; see also Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 12 (2d Cir.
1983) (defendant was free to purchase shares of target company prior to an-
nouncement of tender offer where he owed no duty of disclosure to target cor-
poration's unwitting shareholder), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984); Pacific Ins.
Co. v. Blot, 267 F. Supp. 956, 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (failure of defendant outsider
to disclose to selling shareholders impending tender offer did not constitute Rule
lob-5 violation); Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753, 764-65 (D.N.J. 1955)
(purchaser of shares had duty to disclose knowledge of future prospects when
purchaser held fiduciary position and knowledge was obtained as result of that
insider position).
59. See Arkin, Insider Trading-Distinguishing Unequal Advantage from Fraud,
N.Y.L.J., June 19, 1986, at 1, col. 3 [hereinafter Insider Trading-Distinguishing
Unequal Advantage from Fraud]. The Court's reversal of Chiarella's conviction,
based on the nature of the relationship between Chiarella and the corporation upon
whose information he traded, comports with these principles. Chiarella, 445 U.S.
at 237. Chiarella had no duty to corporations in whose securities he traded because
he did not share with the corporations the fiduciary relationship necessary for
imposing insider liability. See id. at 235. For a detailed discussion of the inconsistency
between the Supreme Court's decision and the modern trend in the Second Circuit,
see infra notes 80-100 and accompanying text.
60. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
61. See id. at 648-49.
62. See id. at 649.
63. Id. at 649-51. The issue in Dirks was at what point does a non-corporate
insider who receives material nonpublic information, i.e., a "tippee," assume a
duty to disclose or abstain from trading. See id. at 655.
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In sanctioning Dirks, the SEC once again ignored the issue of whether
a relationship between Dirks and Equity Funding existed. 64 The
Commission declared that when tippees, regardless of their motivation
or occupation, come into possession of material nonpublic infor-
mation that they know is confidential, and when they know, or
have reason to know, that such information is coming from a
corporate insider, they must disclose the information or refrain from
trading on it.65
The Supreme Court, expanding upon its holding in Chiarella,66
reiterated the "established doctrine ' 67 that a duty is predicated upon
the existence of a previously recognized fiduciary duty. 68 Again, the
Court emphasized the necessity of a special confidential relationship
between the parties, not merely one's ability to acquire and utilize
nonpublic inside corporate information because of his position in
the marketplace. 69 Recognizing the harmful effects that would result
to the securities industry from an overly broad construction of the
laws governing insider trading, the Court stressed the need for
certainty in the area of insider trading. 70
Dirks was an expansion of Chiarella because, whereas Chiarella
received the information by virtue of his position, Dirks was a
tippee-who had acquired the information from a corporate insider v.7
64. See id. at 650-51.
65. See id. at 651. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit affirmed the SEC administrative ruling. 681 F.2d 824, 846 (D.C.
Cir. 1982), rev'd, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). However, the circuit court's opinion was
predicated upon a different theory: Dirks, by virtue of his position as a securities
analyst associated with a registered broker dealer, acquired a broad disclosure
obligation in favor of the public at large. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 665 n.26 (explaining
circuit court's analysis). In its majority opinion, the Supreme Court noted that the
SEC neither addressed this theory in the administrative case, nor presented it before
the court of appeals or the Supreme Court. See id.
66. See supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
67. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654.
68. See id. at 654-55.
69. The Court stressed that the "basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is
not simply that such persons acquired nonpublic corporate information, but rather
that they have entered into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of
the business of the enterprise and are given access to information solely for corporate
purposes." Id. at 655 n.14.
70. The Dirks Court declaredthat "[i]mposing a duty to disclose or .abstain
solely because a person knowingly receives material nonpublic information from
an insider and trades on it could have an inhibiting influence on the role of market
analysts, which the SEC itself recognizes is necessary to the preservation of a
healthy market." Id. at 658; see also id. at 658 n.17 (market analysts will be
inhibited in their analyses because of their uncertainty as to when line between
permissible and impermissible disclosures is crossed).
71. See id. at 648-49.
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Nevertheless, the Court steadfastly stood by the well established
doctrine of insider liability72 and declared that in determining whether
a tippee is liable, the courts must look to the insider from whom
the tippee received the information. 73 Because the very core of insider
trading liability rests upon the issue of whether a corporate insider
has breached a fiduciary duty he owed to the corporation's share-
holders, 74 Dirks held that only when the tippee participated and
knew or should have known of the insider's breach does he acquire
a duty to disclose or abstain. 75
A tippee's duty to the shareholders of a corporation arises only
when the insider breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by
disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee knew or
should have known of this breach. 76 The threshold issue then becomes
whether the tip constituted a breach of the insider's duty. 77 This
question, as Dirks pointed out, 78 raises legitimate concerns, because
disclosures of confidential corporate information are not necessarily
inconsistent with the duty the insider owes to the shareholders7
9
72. See id. at 656-58.
73. See id. at 659.
74. See id. at 660-61.
75. See id. at 659-61.
76. See id. at 660. The Court then compared its holding in Dirks with the
SEC's ruling in In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971). See supra
note 38. In Investors Management, SEC Commissioner Smith posited the view,
consistent with the Court's reasoning in Dirks, that the tippee's responsibility must
relate back to the insider in order to hold that the tippee has violated a duty to
the shareholders of a corporation on the theory that the tippee used information
which resulted in a breach of the insider's duty when the insider gave it to him.
44 S.E.C. at 651; see supra note 38.
Although the facts in Dirks and Investors Management are very similar, they
also differ significantly which probably accounts for the disparate results reached
in these two cases. Investors Management involved an administrative proceeding
against investment advisors who sold stock in McDonnell Douglas Corporation
based on selective disclosure by Merrill Lynch of nonpublic adverse information
to institutional investors. Merrill Lynch accepted a sanction and subsequently es-
tablished a Chinese Wall between its investment banking and brokerage departments
to prevent such misuse of inside information. See Exchange Act Release No. 8459,
[1968 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 77,629 (Nov. 25, 1968); see also Blanc,
Chinese Walls, Tippers, Tippees and Dennis Levine, N.Y.L.J., June 2, 1986, at
23, col. 1 (possible ramifications of the Levine decision on investment banking
community). Dirks, however, did not have any fiduciary relationship with Equity
Funding vis A vis Merrill Lynch's relationship with McDonnell Douglas Corp. Dirks,
463 U.S. at 665. The SEC did not recognize this difference in Dirks' administrative
proceeding. See 21 S.E.C. No. 1401 (1981).
77. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 661.
78. See id. at 661-62.
79. For example, the Court stated that it may not be clear to the insider or
recipient financial analyst whether the information is material and nonpublic. See
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III. The Chiarella Dissent and its Ramifications: Carpenter and
the Misappropriation Theory
The Note will now discuss the misappropriation theory as presented
in Chief Justice Burger's Chiarella dissent. This will be followed by
a discussion of the theory as applied in United States v. Carpenter.
A. The Chiarella Dissent
Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Chiarella presents the misappro-
priation theory as an alternative theory of liability under Rule lOb-5.10
The misappropriation theory, a theory that is now law in the Second
Circuit,"' has eliminated the well established principle requiring a duty
between the insider and the issuer in whose securities he trades before
liability accrues.2
The Second Circuit's departure begins with the common law
fiduciary duty of an agent to maintain the confidentiality of his
principal's secrets and nonpublic proprietary information.83 Accord-
ingly, an employee may not appropriate for his own benefit his
employer's confidential information.8 4 When an employee has ap-
propriated confidential information from his employer, he has com-
mitted a fraud upon his employer.8 5 The misappropriation theory,
id. at 662. The corporate official may think that certain information has already
been disclosed or is not material enough to affect the market. See id. In this
instance, the Court stated that whether an existing duty has been breached depends
on the purpose of the disclosure. See id. The test is whether the insider will
personally gain from his disclosure. See id.
80. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 239-45 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
81. See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter; 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.), cert. granted,
107 S. Ct. 666 (1986); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1053 (1985); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
82. See supra notes 35-79 and accompanying text.
83. The Restatement (Second) of Agency states:
[An agent is subject to a duty to the principal not to use or to communicate
information confidentially given him by the principal or acquired by
him during the course of or on account of his agency or in violation
of his duties as agent, in competition with or to the injury of the
principal, on his own account or on behalf of another, although such
information does not relate to the transaction in which he is then em-
ployed, unless the information is a matter of general knowledge.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1958).
84. See id.; see also Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1031. The Carpenter court stated
that it was clear that Winans had breached a duty of confidentiality to his employer
by misappropriating confidential prepublished information. See id. The court em-
phasized, however, that the issue was whether such breach served as a predicate
for securities fraud. See id. at 1028, 1031-32.
85. See id. at 1031-33. By misappropriating the information, the court held
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as applied in United States v. Carpenter,6 postulates that when the
information is securities-related, for example when it concerns a
prospective takeover bid or merger of a company and the employee
(agent) uses this information for his own personal advantage, the
employee's fraud is securities fraud under Rule 10b-5. s7 Thus, the
misappropriation theory extends the antifraud provisions of the se-
curities laws to encompass the common law tort of breach by an
employee of the duty of confidentiality owed to his employer when
the breach is securities-related.
B. United States v. Carpenter
R. Foster Winans, a reporter for The Wall Street Journal, was
a co-author of the Journal's column, "Heard on the Street.""8 This
column was basically a collection of the opinions of Wall Street
analysts regarding the movements and prospects of particular se-
curities. s9 The column was widely read and influential, and thus
tended to have short-term influences9° upon the value of the securities
which were discussed. 91
The district court found that Winans received $30,000 from his co-
defendants for systematically providing them with information regard-
ing the content and timing of about twenty-seven "Heard on the
Street" articles.92 Winans and his co-defendants used this informa-
tion to their benefit.93 By trading on the basis of their advance
that Winans " 'stole, to put it bluntly-valuable nonpublic information entrusted
to him in the utmost confidence.' " Id. at 1031 (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at
245) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)). In fact, Chief Justice Burger would have had the
provisions of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 "reach any person engaged in any
fraudulent scheme." 445 U.S. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original);
accord Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1032 (because rule says fraud and deceit upon any
person, it was sufficient that fraud was committed upon Winans' employer).
86. See Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1031-36.
87. See id. at 1031; see also Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 245 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
This reasoning would fit in well within Rule lOb-5 if the rule is read literally. The
rule encompasses "any act ... which operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit ... in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1987). The repeated use of the word "any" led the Carpenter court
to believe Congress intended such a broad reading of the rule. Carpenter, 791 F.2d
at 1029-30.
88. Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1026.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 1026; infra note 95 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 90.
92. See United States v. Winans, 612 F. Supp. 827, 834 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd
in part; rev'd in part sub nom. United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d
Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 666 (1986).
93. See Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1026-27.
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knowledge of the content of the column and the timing of its
publication, the defendants netted profits of approximately $700,000.9
This practice by financial reporters is known as "scalping" -using
advance knowledge of the timing and substance of articles to trade
in securities or enabling others to do soY5
During November, 1983, the Compliance Department of Kidder,
Peabody & Co., Inc. discovered a correlation between the trading
of securities in the account of Kenneth Felis, a Kidder, Peabody
employee, and some of the securities discussed in "Heard on the
Street."'96 Upon questioning by a Kidder, Peabody supervisor, Felis
denied any impropriety.97 Felis then reallocated certain funds among
various trading accounts to conceal his continued operation in the
scheme. 98 The scheme was uncovered by an ensuing SEC investigation,
however, when Felis' co-conspirators, Carpenter and Winans, vol-'
untarily testified on March 29, 1984 about the scheme.99 In 1985,
the district court found Felis, Carpenter and Winans guilty of mis-
appropriating material nonpublic information from the The Wall
Street Journal in connection with the purchase and sale of securi-
ties. 100
In asserting that their conduct could not serve as a predicate for
securities fraud liability, the defendants distinguished their case from
the two previous applications by the Second Circuit of the misap-
propriation theory:10 United States v. Newman'0 2 and SEC v. Ma-
teria.103
In Newman, employees of the investment banking firms of Morgan
Stanley & Co. and Kuhn Loeb & Co. received material nonpublic
information entrusted to their employers by corporate clients con-
94. See id.
95. See Financial Reporters, supra note 2, at 1037; see also Peskind, Regulation
of the Financial Press: A New Dimension of Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5, 14 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 80, 81 (1969); see, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.,
375 U.S. 180, 181 (1963) (scalping is process whereby investment advisor purchases
securities for his own account, recommends securities to his client, then sells his
securities following recommendation); Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261, 1265
(9th Cir. 1979) (scalping described as practice of purchasing securities shortly before
publication of columns concerning companies, then selling after columns published
caused jump in price).




100. See United States v. Winans, 612 F. Supp. at 849-50.
101. See Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1028-29.
102. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
103. 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985).
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cerning prospective tender offers. 104 Newman, a broker, conspired
with two foreign citizens to purchase stock in companies that were
merger or acquisition targets of the firms' clients by using secret
foreign accounts. 105
In Materia, an employee of a financial printer was able to decipher
the identities of tender offer targets from documents regarding pro-
posed tender offers. 1°6 Within hours of each such discovery, Materia
purchased stock in the target company and then sold his holdings
for substantial gains after information of the proposed tender offers
became public.' 07 In both Newman and Materia, the Second Circuit
held that these misappropriations of information constituted a fraud
upon the defendants' employers by damaging their employers' rep-
utations.108 These fraudulent acts, the court held, served as the
predicate for securities fraud violations within the realm of Rule
10b-5.'°9The defense in Carpenter argued that Newman and Materia were
factually distinguishable from Carpenter."0 In both Newman and
Materia, the material nonpublic information was misappropriated
by employees who had a duty of confidentiality not only to their
employers, but also to their employers' clients. "1 This latter duty,
104. See Newman, 664 F.2d at 15.
105. See id.
106. See Materia, 745 F.2d at 199.
107. See id.
108. See Newman, 664 F.2d at 17; see also Materia, 745 F.2d at 202. In Newman,
the court ruled that by their actions, the conspirators injured Morgan Stanley and
Kuhn Loeb's reputations, and defrauded them "as surely as if they took their
money." 664 F.2d at 17. In Materia, the court held that the defendant defrauded
his employer by damaging "its reputation as a safe repository for clients' secrets."
745 F.2d at 202.
109. See Materia, 745 F.2d at 203; Newman, 664 F.2d at 19.
110. See Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1028-29. The court criticized the appellants'
argument, saying that it suggested that it was not enough that Winans breached
his duty of confidentiality to his employer; "he would have to have breached a
duty to the corporations or shareholders thereof whose stock they purchased or
sold on the basis of that information." Id. at 1029.
111. See id. at 1028-29. Although the Newman and Materia courts found that
the reputations of the employers were harmed by the misappropriation of confidential
information by. their employees, the injuries alone were not enough to sustain
violations under the securities laws. See Materia, 745 F.2d at 202; Newman, 664
F.2d at 17. Ultimately, application of the securities laws turned on the duty that
existed between the employees and the employers' clients. See Materia, 745 F.2d
at 202; Newman, 664 F.2d at 17-18. The Newman concurrence/dissent recognized
the lack of a duty between the defendants and the companies in whose securities
they traded: "Though they deceptively and improperly violated a fiduciary duty
to their employers and customers of their employers, those parties had not at that
time actually purchased or sold any target company securities." Id. at 20 (Dumbauld,
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according to the defense, was not present in Carpenter.112
The Carpenter defendants were attempting to invoke the long-
standing requirement that to violate the securities laws' antifraud
provisions, one must breach a fiduciary duty to the company con-
cerning whose information he trades."' Thus, prior to Carpenter,
the misappropriation theory applied to cases in which the employee
had traded on the basis of material nonpublic information acquired
from his employer to whom he owed a fiduciary duty to protect
the confidential information given his employer by corporate clients.
Winans may have breached his duty of confidentiality to his em-
ployer, The Wall Street Journal; however, this Note asserts that
Winans, unlike the defendants in Newman and Materia, did not
breach a duty of confidentiality to the corporations concerning whose
information he traded. He would have breached such a duty if,
when he traded in a company's securities, he possessed material
nonpublic information concerning the company. As the district court
found, "Winans was not a temporary insider [of the corporations
he wrote about in his column], did not owe any duty to the cor-
porations he wrote about, and was not a tippee of any corporate
inside information." 4
Thus, the Second Circuit holding was directly contrary to Chiarella,
in which the Supreme Court explicitly held that when a noncorporate
insider, such as Winans, cannot be considered a fiduciary to the
persons with whom he traded, no duty of disclosure exists." 5 Fur-
thermore, as in Dirks, the securities-related information involved
was assembled by Winans through his own analytical skills. Also,
J., concurring and dissenting). Senior District Judge Dumbauld, however, concurred
in reversing the dismissal of the defendant's indictment because the defendant clearly
violated the mail fraud statute in his explicit scheme to defraud. Id. at 20-21
(Dumbauld, J., concurring and dissenting); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
112. The defense argued that in Newman and Materia, the employer had the
same duty of confidentiality to the corporations as did the employee, while Winans
and the Wall Street Journal had a completely different status vis A vis the cor-
porations in whose securities Winans traded. See Brief for Defendant-Appellant R.
Foster Winans at 18-19, United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.), cert.
granted, 107 S. Ct. 666 (1986). This argument, presented to the court by the
defense, illustrated the difference between Winans and the Wall Street Journal in
trading on the subjects of Winans' column. See infra note 133 for a discussion of
the result in distinguishing Winans from the Journal.
113. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
114. 612 F. Supp. at 841. The district court continued, stating that "li]n terms
of the securities laws, neither Winans nor the Wall Street Journal owed any duties
at all to the corporations that were the subject of Heard [on the Street] columns
or to the shareholders of those corporations." Id.
115. See supra notes 44-59 and accompanying text.
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the employer in this case, The Wall Street Journal, was a newspaper
and had no duty of disclosure to the corporations appearing in
Winans' column. 1 6
Nonetheless, the Second Circuit rejected the defense's argument
by finding their reading of the misappropriation theory, as expounded
in Newman and Materia, too restrictive." 7 In resuming where it had
left off in Materia,"8 the court further widened the scope of insider
liability, continuing its deviation from the Chiarella guidelines"19 and
held the theory to encompass misappropriation by insiders "or
others"'20 of material nonpublic securities related information. 12'
In sum, the Carpenter holding rests upon an expansion of the
misappropriation theory to encompass the common law tort of breach
of the duty of confidentiality to an employer. Allowing the web of
Rule lOb-5 to expand exponentially as in Carpenter, the courts have
expanded the notion of trading upon inside information beyond the
purview of Dirks and Chiarella.2
IV. Securities Laws Protection: Employer/Employee Duties and
Internal Corporate Policy
The implications of a misappropriation theory are two-fold: not
only will an employee who uses confidential securities-related in-
formation obtained from his employer be liable under Rule lOb-5,
but a third party-one owing no fiduciary duty to the corporation-
116. The Carpenter court did not have to reach the question of whether trading
based upon advance knowledge of the contents of an upcoming issue of a financial
publication, without of a breach of a fiduciary duty, was actionable under the
antifraud provisions of the securities laws. See Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1033 n.10.
117. See id. at 1029.
118. See Materia, 745 F.2d at 203 (liability will not arise merely because one "misap-
propriates nonpublic information in breach of a fiduciary duty and trades on that
information to his own advantage").
119. See supra notes 44-59 and accompanying text.
120. Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1029 (emphasis in original).
121. The Carpenter court, in broadly construing the theory, relied upon the
language used in Materia, requiring merely that a person " 'misappropriates non-
public information in breach of a fiduciary duty and trades on that information'
.... [S]ection 10(b) was not 'aimed solely at the eradication of fraudulent trading
by corporate insiders.' " Id. at 1029 (quoting Materia, 745 F.2d at 203, 201). In
order to bring breach of the common law employer/employee duty within the ambit
of Rule lOb-5, the court stressed that the rule prohibits "any person ... [from engag-
ing in] any act . . .which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any person." Id. at
1029-30; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987). This literal interpretation is clearly
inconsistent with Congressional intent behind the statute. See infra notes 126-32 and
accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 44-79 and accompanying text.
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who obtains material nonpublic information for the purpose of
trading upon that information will also be liable under Rule lOb-5.'1 3
This liability clearly conflicts with the intended purpose of the
antifraud provisions of the securities laws.' 24
At common law, an employee owes a duty of confidentiality to
his employer regarding material nonpublic information in his em-
ployer's possession. 125 In the event the employee breaches this duty
(for example, by misappropriating confidential information), the
employer has a remedy. 126 Carpenter held that as a result of Winans'
breach of duty to his employer, Winans was under a corollary duty
to disclose or to abstain from trading on the basis of this misap-
propriated information. 127 The only duty Winans violated was his
duty to his employer. 2 Furthermore, the court did not base this
violation on the well established common law principle of fiduciary
relationship between an employer and an employee, 29 but rather on
internal corporate policy. 30 The court found misappropriation be-
cause as a matter of its own corporate policy, Winans' employer,
The Wall Street Journal, told its employees at the end of a lengthy
policy manual that information regarding the Journal's activities was
confidential. '3'
123. The Second Circuit's line of reasoning would also give rise to liability when
a third party with no fiduciary relationship purloins confidential information from
a corporation and trades on it. See Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1032; Insider Trading-
Distinguishing Unequal Advantage from Fraud, supra note 59, at 4, col. 2. In
Carpenter, the Second Circuit's requisite of fraud existed and since this fraud arose
in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, it was securities fraud. See
Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1032.
124. See supra notes 51-79 and accompanying text.
125. See supra note 83.
126. See id. The general tort of breach of a duty of confidentiality to an employer
is well-settled. See, e.g., Frank v. Wiltscheck, 209 F.2d 493, 495 (2d Cir. 1953).
127. Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1034.
128. See id. at 1028; supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
129. See Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1033-34.
130. See id. In Carpenter, the Wall Street Journal policy, which included a
variety of topics, provided that employees should not buy or sell stocks in anticipation
of articles they know will appear and should not disclose the subjects of upcoming
articles to outsiders. See Brief for Defendant-Appellant R. Foster Winans at 5,
United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 666
(1986).
131. Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1026, 1033-34. When an employee purloins infor-
mation entrusted to his employer by a client, the employer's reputation for con-
fidentiality to his clients is injured. See id. at 1033; Materia, 745 F.2d at 202. But
the damage to the employer's reputation for confidentiality that seemed to be the
sole basis for the securities violation in Carpenter was not enough to sustain a
Rule lOb-5 violation under the misappropriation theory as applied in Newman and
Materia. See supra note 111. It was the duty to the employers' clients in Newman
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Carpenter acknowledged that if it were not for the Journal's policy,
there would have been no securities violation. 3 2 The intended pur-
poses of the securities laws, however, are not served by applying
them to situations such as the one presented in Carpenter."' The
and Materia which supported a finding of securities law violations, not merely the
injury of the employers' reputation for confidentiality. See id. In Carpenter, it is
arguable that the reputation of the Wall Street Journal was undamaged because
its policy of confidentiality was not disclosed to the general public until after the
commencement of the Carpenter case. See Obermaier, supra note 1, at 2, col. 3.
132. Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1033-34. The court held that "because of [their]
duty of confidentiality to the Journal- defendant[s] . . .had a corollary duty, which
they breached, under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 . . . ." Id. at 1034.
133. The Second Circuit's adoption of the misappropriation theory based upon
the facts of Carpenter raises several questions. First, one purpose of the federal
securities laws is to protect the integrity of the securities industry. See supra note
21. In contrast, the defendant in Carpenter was not in the securities industry, but
was a journalist, and the only business relationship he had was with his readers.
See Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1026. The information that Winans put together con-
cerning the corporate subjects of his column could only be attributed to his analytical
skills as a financial reporter. See Insider Trading-Distinguishing Unequal Advantage
from Fraud, supra note 59, at 4, col. 2; see also United States v. Winans, 612
F. Supp. 827, 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd in part; rev'd in part sub nom. United
States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 666 (1986).
Second, the court recognized that there would have been no securities violation
by the Wall Street Journal if the newspaper company itself had traded on the
same information. Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1033-34. Strangely, neither Winans nor
the Wall Street Journal had a fiduciary duty to the subjects of the column but
one will be liable under the securities laws for trading on the basis of information
about the subjects of the column. See Obermaier, supra note 1, at 2, col. 3.
Furthermore, if the Journal could trade and the columnist could not trade b~cause
of policy reasons addressed to the concerns of the securities markets, the impact
is irrelevant from the perspective of the investor. Because of the impersonal nature
of the New York Stock Exchange, in which one cannot tell the difference between
the buyers and sellers, the investing public is no more protected by the misap-
propriation theory as applied here. See id. at 2, col. 4. The average investor has
no idea that a newspaper columnist is prohibited by the newspaper's policy from
trading in advance on information contained in his column nor is it likely that he
knows Rule lOb-5 exists. In addition, it would not appear to matter to the buyers
and sellers of the securities contained in Winans' column whether the transactions
were made by Winans or his employer. Accordingly, in a Third Circuit case which
involved a similar misappropriation, Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, Judge Higginbotham,
in his concurrence, recognized that as to the insiders who traded on the basis of
nonpublic information of a corporation for the benefit of their joint venture, it
made no difference to the investing public whether they had traded upon such
information on behalf of the corporation or on behalf of the joint venture. 771
F.2d 818, 824 (3d Cir. 1985) (Higginbotham, J., concurring), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 1895 (1987). For the purposes of Rule lOb-5, "this is a difference that makes
no difference." Id. at 825 (Higginbotham, J., concurring). Judge Higginbotham con-
curred that Rule lOb-5 applied, but under a different theory, that insiders fit into
the rule as "tippees" under a Dirks approach. Id. at 825-26 (Higginbotham, J., con-
curring). He recognized that the majority merely attempted to force the case under
the Third Circuit's newly adopted "misappropriation or breach-of-fudiciary-duty-to-
a-third-person theory." Id. (Higginbotham, J., concurring).
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misappropriation theory, therefore, is not related to the purposes
of the Exchange Act and involves federal enforcement of a common
law duty to an employer rather than regulation of the securities
markets.
Taking an overly broad view of the insider's duty calls into question.
the applicability of the insider trading laws to arbitrageurs. 3 4 In
light of Dirks' holding that not all trading upon material nonpublic
information constitutes an insider trading violation, and in light of
the strong public interest recognized by Dirks, which in effect en-
courages access to information by marketing analysts,'35 adopting a
broad application of the insider trading laws misconstrues the anti-
fraud provisions' very applicability. 3 6 A wealth of information is
available to arbitrageurs that is not generally available to most
investors.' This information becomes available to arbitrageurs when
they merely perform in the way they have been trained. It would
be unjust for the courts to assume that an insider violation or
conspiracy has occurred every time an arbitrageur has obtained
material information unknown to the public at large. 3 '
134. See Insider Trading-Distinguishing Unequal Advantage from Fraud, supra
note 59, at 4, col. 1. An arbitrageur is one who trades in different markets,
purchasing a security in one and selling in another hoping to profit from the price
discrepancies in the markets. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 95 (5th ed. 1979). If,
for example, ABC stock could be bought in New York for $10 a share and sold
in London at $10.50, an arbitrageur may simultaneously purchase ABC stock in
New York and sell the same amount in London, making a profit of 50 cents per
share.
135. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658-59.
136. There are instances where trading on nonpublic information is lawful. See,
e.g., Leveraged Buyout, supra note 25, at 718 (alleging insider conspiracy when
management acts on inside information in management buyout transaction, while
having certain conspiratorial appeal, overlooks practical aspects of transaction). A
director of enforcement for the SEC stated that " 'if an investor has reason to
suspect-only suspect-that a stock tip is based on private corporate information
and that the stock price would be affected if the public knew about it, it would
probably be illegal for him to trade in the stock.' " N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1986,
News of the Week in Review, at 5, col. 4 (quoting Gary Lynch). This reasoning
contradicts the Supreme Court and common view of what type of securities trading
is legally permissible. See supra notes 39-79 and accompanying text. It is arguable
whether any securities trading would take place in a marketplace which has available
only the formal public filings of corporate issuers. While the insider trading panic
affecting the securities markets has led to acceptance in the Second Circuit of the
SEC director's previously quoted reasoning, the Supreme Court has stated and
reaffirmed in Chiarella and Dirks its more realistic opinion of what actions should
be characterized as unlawful insider trading. See id.
137. See infra note 138.
138. See Insider Trading-Distinguishing Unequal Advantage from Fraud, supra
note 59, at 4, col. 2. Arbitrageurs have information which, as a practical matter,
is not available to most investors: "computerized scanning of the tape, SEC filings,
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Advocates of the misappropriation theory assert that courts should
interpret Rule lOb-5 according to its plain meaning: "fraud or deceit
. in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.' 1 39
Under the theory, however, the analysis of the duty requirement
implemented by courts is far from plain. 14 Chiarella made clear
that a duty to disclose or refrain from trading "arises from the
relationship between parties.' 14' The Supreme Court has explicitly
rejected the principle that the securities laws were intended to ensure
equality of information in the securities markets, or that buyers and
sellers of securities owe a general duty to the marketplace. 142 More-
over, in Sante Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,143 the Supreme Court
held that Rule lOb-5 violations are not made out by "all breaches
of fiduciary duty in connection with a securities transaction."'"
Certainly, a Rule lOb-5 violation should not be found because a
private company imposed a duty by way of implementing internal
policy designed to protect its reputation and that duty has been
breached. 141
In Carpenter, the Second Circuit has deviated from Congress'
purpose in enacting Rule lOb-5.146 Congress enacted the securities
acts to protect the investing public and to preserve market integrity,
not to regulate the employer/employee duties which have long been
regulated by the common law. 147 The Second Circuit's expansive
reading of Rule lOb-5 is an understandable response to the growing
problem of insider trading. 148 Nevertheless, the question remains
careful reading of the financial press, . . . attendance at analysts' meetings, lawful
knowledge as to who is buying or selling any particular securities." Id.
139. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987). For a discussion of the applicability of the
literal language of Rule 10b-5, see supra note 129.
140. See supra notes 101-22 and accompanying text.
141. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231 n.14.
142. See id. at 233; Dirks, 463 U.S. at 657-58.
143. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
144. Id. at 472. The Second Circuit expressly rejected the principle of "duty in
the air." Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 13 (2d Cir. 1983) (quoting
Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347, 1353 (S.D.N.Y. '1983)), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984).
145. At the district court level in Carpenter, the court conceded that if not for
the violation of the Wall Street Journal policy, the petitioners would not have
violated the securities laws. United States v. Winans, 612 F. Supp. at 842. As
noted in the petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, the Wall
Street Journal policy specifically represented that Wall Street Journal employees
went well "beyond the requirements of the law" by adhering to such policy. Petition
for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
at 7, Carpenter v. United States (No. 86-422 Oct. Term 1986).
146. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 1.
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whether this response is justified. The answer to this question requires
a brief reflection on the role of courts in our society.
Justice Frankfurter, in his article on the intricacies of reading
statutes, used the teachings of the great masters in the art of
interpretation as his guide: Holmes, Brandeis and Cardozo. 149 These
Justices remembered that statutes are "expressions of policy ...
addressed to the attainment of particular ends." 1 50 Judges are con-
fined to their judicial function, which is to ascertain the meaning
of words used by the legislature.' "To go beyond it is to usurp
a power which our democracy has lodged in its elected legislature. ' 11 2
Judges must avoid whatever temptations they might have to legislate
policy when construing a statute.'53 Consistent with statutory language
149. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REv.
527 (1947) [hereinafter Reflections].
150. See id. at 533.
151. See E. CRAWFORD, CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 245-46 (1940) (only legitimate
object of construction is to ascertain intent of legislature and to give it effect)
[hereinafter CRAWFORD].
152. Reflections, supra note 149, at 533.
153. It is essential that the judiciary know its bounds:
The vital difference between initiating policy ... and merely carrying
out a formulated policy, indicates the relatively narrow limits within
which choice is fairly open to courts and the extent to which interpreting
law is inescapably making law. To say that ... courts make law just
as do legislatures is to deny essential features in the history of our
democracy. It denies that legislation and adjudication have had different
lines of growth, serve vitally different purposes, function under different
conditions, and bear different responsibilities.
Id. at 534. Justice Traynor recognized these constraints in his lecture on statutory
construction:
The court itself cannot be the engine of social reform. The very re-
sponsibilities of a judge as an arbiter disqualify him as a crusader....
Unlike the legislator, whose lawmaking knows no bounds, the judge stays
close to his house of the law .... A judge is constrained by training,
experience, and the office itself, not to undertake responsibilities that
belong to the legislature.
R. Traynor, Murray Lecture at the University of Iowa College of Law, March 31,
1977, reprinted in 3 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 265-74 (4th ed.
rev. 1984).
If courts were permitted to ignore legislative intent or statutory language, they
would invade the province of the legislature and violate this country's tri-partite theory
of government. CRAWFORD, supra note 151, at 245; T. SEDGWICK, STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION 252-53 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter SEDOWICK]. The legislature would
become a nonentity and the courts would make the laws. CRAWFORD, supra note
151, at 245. Recently, the Supreme Court declared that where there is " 'clearly
expressed legislative intention' contrary to [the enactment's] language," the Court
must "question the strong presumption that Congress expresses its intent through
the language it chooses." I.N.S. v. Cardozo-Fonesca, 107 S. Ct. 1207, 1213 n.12
(1987) (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S.
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and legislative history, a statute must be applied pursuant to the
purpose for which Congress enacted it.'14 Section 10(b) was not
intended to be the great protector of internal corporate policy or of
employer/employee common law duties.' 55
Justice Cardozo stated that the meaning of statutes must be searched
for in "relation to the end in view." 15 ' "In a democracy the legislative
impulse and its expression should come from those popularly chosen
to legislate, and equipped to devise policy, as courts are not." '157
An argument that Congress' purpose in enacting section 10(b) should
be responsive and expanded to encompass the growing concerns of
insider trading is a principle that has been expressly rejected.'58 Judges
are not to delve into the minds of legislators or committee members
in ascertaining the subjective design of a statute to accommodate
growing concerns of modern society.159 The purpose given to a statute
is not one which Congress "would" have enacted, rather, it is that
which it "did" enact. 6 '
102, 108 (1980)).
Unless judicial authority is carefully exercised, the boundary between the legislature
and judiciary would disintegrate and the law-making power would fall to the branch
of government which was not intended to have any share in the enactment of laws.
SEDGWICK, supra, at 19. Unless a line drawn between the legislature and judiciary
is clearly marked and strictly maintained, "jurisprudence will always fall short of
the scientific character to which it aspires." Id. at 184.
154. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 200 (1976).
155. See supra notes 124-45 and accompanying text.
156. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433, 439 (1935) (Cardozo, J.,
dissenting).
157. Reflections, supra note 149, at 545.
158. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
159. Against what he believed to be such an attempt, Justice Cardozo once
protested:
The judgment of the [C]ourt, if I interpret the reasoning aright, does
not rest upon a ruling that Congress would have gone beyond its power
if the purpose that it professed was the purpose truly cherished. The
judgment of the [Clourt rests upon the ruling that another purpose, not
professed, may be read beneath the surface, and by the purpose so
imputed the statute is destroyed. Thus the process of psychoanalysis has
spread to unaccustomed fields.
United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 298-99 (1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
160. Reflections, supra note 149, at 539. Much has been written on the art of
interpreting and construing statutes beyond that covered in this Note. Whenever
a court engages in statutory interpretation, it exercises judgment that may affect
the outcome and thus make law contrary to the American jurisprudential perception
of the separation of powers. See Abrams, The Place of Procedural Control in Deter-
mining Who May Sue or Be Sued: Lessons in Statutory Interpretation from Civil
RICO and Sedima, 38 VAN. L. REv. 1477, 1490-1506 (1985). A court must be careful
not to exceed its bounds and enter the realm of the legislature. See id.
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V. Conclusion
The misappropriation theory is not consistent with the statutory
purposes of the Exchange Act. It involves federal enforcement of
a common law duty to an employer rather than regulation of the
securities markets. The Supreme Court has limited the scope of
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to cases in which corporate insiders-
or those with whom they are privy-breach fiduciary duties by trading
on material information not available to the shareholders of the
corporation in whose securities they trade. Chiarella stated, and
Dirks reiterated, the long-standing requirement established by Cady,
Roberts-Rule 10b-5 applies only when there is "a duty to disclose
arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between parties
to a transaction."161 In Carpenter, no such relationship or duty existed
between Winans and the sources of his information. Unless one reads
a party of information requirement-rejected by Chiarella and Dirks-
into section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, this extension of the securities laws
to the conduct in Carpenter has no basis.
The kind of judicial legislation engaged in by the Second Circuit
in Carpenter is inappropriate. Admittedly, the recent and growing
concerns in the area of insider trading mandate action by the SEC
to promulgate rules setting new policy to accommodate these con-
cerns. Extending the Exchange Act in its present state to accom-
modate these growing concerns, however, was not the intent of
Congress in enacting such legislation. To do so would subvert an
act of Congress, thereby impairing congressional supremacy in sub-
stantive policymaking.
Elliot Brecher
161. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230.
1076 [Vol. XV
